by: Sirianne Dahlum, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Magnus B. Rasmussen and Tore Wig
| Leaders do not rule alone, but rely on coalitions of regime supporters to govern and remain in power. We discuss, specify, and test arguments pertaining to how size or diversity of regime support coalitions influence regime longevity. We use recently collected data on support coalition characteristics, with global coverage and time series exceeding 230 years, and find that larger as well as more diverse coalitions are both positively related to regime longevity. Both patterns hold up fairly well in different time periods and in sub-samples including only autocratic regimes. We also discuss and find indications that increased coalition size may limit certain types of regime breakdown (e.g., from popular uprisings) but not others (e.g., coups). Coalition diversity is negatively related to different types of regime breakdown, and these patterns may reflect that diverse coalitions offer regimes access to variegated power resources that enable them to mitigate different threats. |
