by: Jun Fang
| As alternative institutions of governance, indirect and direct rule have different implications for the costs and benefits of governing a territory. We argue when the economic benefits provided by the peripheral regions to the central state are minimal, indirect rule would be favored as it helps to minimize the cost of ruling. When the perceived benefits associated with the resources extraction increases, however, rulers are tempted to establish direct rule. We construct a panel dataset to examine the effect of an exogenous price shock on the Qing rulers’ extension of direct rule into the formerly indirectly-ruled southwestern provinces. We find native chiefdoms endowed with copper were more likely to adopt direct rule in times of rising international copper prices. To avoid military confrontation, the Qing state preyed only upon the civilian chiefs, while leaving the military ones untouched, as the latter was appointed to provide social order. Our findings survive several alternative explanations of state building, and go beyond historical China to shed light on other cases where central power balanced their need to extract rents and deter rebellion. |
Authoritarian Political Systems Group 