by: Katerina Tertytchnaya
| Existing research suggests that preventive repression is most effective when it is invisible. Yet contemporary autocrats often publicize their failure to prevent protests. Through the use of quantitative analysis and case studies, I develop a comparative theory of how visible preventive repression aids authoritarian survival by helping autocrats to maintain support for themselves and to avert support for their rivals from growing. According to my argument, visible manifestations of opposition do not always represent failures of repressive regimes, but could reflect a deliberate strategy that incumbents use to manipulate beliefs. Preventive repression may be similar to strategies of propaganda, blurring the boundaries between propaganda as a tool of persuasion and repression as a tool of fear. I illustrate this theory with an analysis of the protest permit system in Putin’s Russia. I draw on original protest-event and media data and rely on multiple rounds of opinion surveys fielded across 2012-2022. |
