by: David Szakonyi
| Do corrupt officials govern differently in elected office? This paper develops a theoretical framework and analyzes new data from financial disclosures to estimate the governing costs of corruption. First, I uncover substantial hidden wealth held by certain legislators in the Russian Duma; these ‘kompromat deputies’ are vulnerable to damaging information being used against them by the regime. Overall, kompromat deputies are less active and more obedient members of parliament. When called to vote, these deputies also align their behavior with the regime’s political agenda, revealing a key mechanism through which challengers are co-opted. Finally, kompromat deputies are less likely to hold onto their seats, being rotated out but not prosecuted, to make room for others interested in paying for access. These results reveal rich variation in the motivations to serve in authoritarian institutions, as elites diverge in both their interest in governing as well as the payoffs from political office. |
Authoritarian Political Systems Group 